INTRODUCTION
A s an organization of over 8,000 members, the American Accounting Association (AAA) has been dedicated to thought leadership for almost a century. Its members create, critically evaluate and debate, and disseminate new ideas where they may be selectively absorbed into public policy and professional practice over time. As thought leaders, AAA members do not confine themselves to a role as reactive agents to policy proposals and actions. Instead, their ideas and analyses serve society through imagination, innovation, criticism, and reflection. They ask inconvenient questions, such as: What do we know? What do we not know? What do we think we know, but do not? And, what we should know? Diversity of perspectives, analyses, and conclusions is valued, not frowned on, at the AAA.
Arthur Conan Doyle's ''dog that did not bark'' is a popular metaphor used in research literature for highlighting how framing our thoughts affects the results of our investigations. Financial reporting is no exception. Measurement and disclosure are two major elements of corporate financial reports. While interconnectivity of the broad range of measurement issues receives comprehensive attention, research and regulatory approaches to disclosure tend to be incremental (each disclosure issue considered individually and independently) and monotonic-more disclosure is better. This way of posing policy questions about disclosure may be easier, but is not necessarily accurate or effective. Analysis suggests that disclosure issues are interconnected in ways that raise serious questions about the incremental approach. Further, more disclosure may or may not be better, and what is better depends on the parties whose interests or viewpoints are under consideration. Contributions to this Symposium present diverse perspectives toward understanding why this might be the case, and ways of addressing questions about disclosure. I briefly mention two relevant issues before summarizing the perspectives presented in the contributions to this Symposium.
AGGREGATION VERSUS DETAIL
Greater detail in financial reports is often equated with greater disclosure, and assumed better to serve user interests. However, more detail calls for more processing of data (information) by the user, and if this ability to process information is limited, greater detail may inhibit the usefulness of the presentation. Limits on ability to process the disclosed information can arise for two reasons. First is the well-known constraint on time and comprehension of the reader, which become more critical with detail. Second, and less widely recognized, is the knowledge and training necessary to process additional detail. Absent such additional interpretive knowledge, increasingly detailed disclosure is just so much more noise to readers; they may get more if they are given less.
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DISCLOSURE TO VARIOUS FACTOR MARKETS
Most analyses of disclosure focus explicitly or implicitly on markets for financial capital. Agency conflict between security holders and management draws attention to implications for the managerial labor market. Disclosure of products, plans, and technologies is important not only to the security holders, but also to competitors in product and supply markets. Markets for non-managerial labor have substantive interest in disclosure of information relevant to conditions and prospects of employment. Communities have interest in environmental disclosures, while governments need disclosure of operations necessary to determine tax obligations of enterprises. Regulation of these disclosures is spread across many federal, state, and local government agencies. It seems fair to suggest that most accounting scholarship is concentrated on the first category of corporate disclosures regulated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Disclosures required by other agencies, even if they are public and financial, receive only sporadic attention in accounting literature.
SYMPOSIUM PAPERS
Bloomfield (2012) uses pragmatic theory of language to argue that the value of, and attention paid to, an item disclosed is not absolute; it depends on its relationship to the background against which each item must be processed by the user. As Doyle would suggest, implications of a single bark of a dog in a quiet night are quite different from the same bark from the same dog which is one of many heard throughout the night. Financial reporting could benefit from greater attention to this relative dimension of disclosure.
Glover (2012) suggests that a general principle (e.g., thou shalt not mislead) may be a better regulatory guideline than a list of specific pieces of information mandated for disclosure. It would put on the preparer the onus to ascertain that the overall story conveyed by the financial reports is robust and does not lead the readers astray. He questions the general validity of several commonly held attitudes toward the presumed virtues of greater disclosure, detail, symmetry, and comparability across firms, as well as of reducing the range of choices available to preparers. He ends with a series of open questions about disclosure that deserve attention. Jamal (2012) introduces the psychology literature on moral licensing and explores its implications for disclosure and regulation. Good behavior makes people feel self-righteous, and may lower their internal defenses against self-serving, even unethical, behavior. Apparently, having chosen a restaurant with salad on its menu, people order more French fries than in restaurants without salads. Moral from disclosing a conflict of interest may weaken the obligation to fiduciary duty of care to the client. Possibility of this psychological interplay between multiple functions of financial reporting presents difficult challenges to regulators of financial reporting. Verrecchia (2012) points out that the implications of disclosure regulation vary with the degree of competitiveness in the markets in which firm's securities are traded. One cannot assume that characterizations which are valid under imperfect competition remain so under perfect competition, and vice versa.
All four papers that follow highlight the importance of context for understanding disclosure and choosing policy, albeit each of them addresses a different dimension of context. They also present interesting challenges for accounting scholarship, as well as policy.
